Under current law, workers can partially opt out of Social Security and reduce Medicare tax liability by accepting compensation in forms exempt from payroll taxes. Changing forms of compensation has an ambiguous effect on a worker's lifetime consumption possibilities. With respect to Medicare, all households are better off since they reduce tax contributions to a fi xed benefi t. For Social Security, the effect is ambiguous since the tax reduction implies future benefi t reductions. Analyzing a hybrid reform proposal that requires workers to place exempted earnings and foregone payroll taxes in a personal retirement account, I fi nd that all workers can increase retirement resources.
INTRODUCTION
C urrent tax law allows workers to opt out, either partially or completely, of the Social Security system. Workers make this choice by opting to receive their compensation in forms not subject to the payroll tax. This decision may increase current disposable income or private retirement resources but will reduce future Social Security benefi ts. This paper analyzes the life cycle consequences, and in particular the impact on retirement resources, of workers' decision to partially opt out of the Social Security system. Overall, I fi nd that a change in form of compensation that reduces exposure to the Social Security and Medicare systems has an ambiguous effect on lifetime consumption. With respect to Medicare, all workers are strictly better off since they reduce contributions to a program that offers a fi xed benefi t. 1 With respect to Social Security, whether a worker will be better off depends on a variety of factors, including the worker's lifetime earnings, the after-tax rate of returns between private saving and social security contributions, income and payroll tax parameters, number of years with reduced exposure, and inter-temporal rates of time preference.
Analyzing a hybrid reform proposal that requires workers to place exempted earnings (an add-on component) and foregone payroll taxes (a carve-out component) in a defi ned contribution retirement account, I fi nd that the hybrid account can improve retirement resources across the earnings distribution. This is primarily attributable to the add-on component since the carve-out component tends to be welfare improving only for higher earning households. Thereby, if workers simply shift existing retirement saving into the retirement account, the retirement welfare effect is ambiguous. The results of this paper are consistent with prior analyses regarding the impact of carve-out type proposal and suggest that policy makers should carefully consider the incentive effects of proposals that reduce the relative generosity of future benefi ts. Tilting the generosity of the system will create additional incentives for workers to change forms of compensation and partially opt out of the Social Security system and reduce exposure to the Medicare tax system. Thereby, otherwise highly compensated workers may appear to be lifetime lower earnings workers, potentially increasing the horizontal and vertical inequality of the system. Social Security reform has been near the forefront of U.S. policy priorities for over a quarter century. A main impetus for this sustained focus is the annual Social Security Trustee's report, which typically highlights the long-run imbalance of the system. Many ideas have been proposed to correct this imbalance, including a reduction in benefi t generosity, increasing contribution rates, increasing immigration rates, investment of the aggregate trust fund in private equities, and allowing workers to use part of their Social Security contributions to establish personal defi ned contribution type accounts. 2 To date, none of these ideas have proven capable of garnering a consensus in Congress. One proposal that has not attracted much attention is allowing cur-rently participating workers to opt out, either partially or fully, of the Social Security system. 3 Under this proposal, participants are given the option of either participating in the system, or exempting earnings from Social Security and assuming all retirement security risk. Clearly, this proposal has several problems. It does not provide a guaranteed retirement security floor. It provides incentives for current consumption over future consumption. Since it can result in adverse selection and moral hazard, it does little to improve the actuarial balance of the system or potential unfunded liabilities of the government. However, of all the proposals discussed in the reform debate, allowing workers the opportunity to partially opt out of the system is the only proposal that is actually part of current law.
The mechanism for allowing workers to partially opt out of the Social Security (and Medicare) system is the tax treatment of certain forms of worker compensation. Under current law, employer contributions to health insurance, life insurance, and retirement savings programs are exempt from payroll taxes, whereas employee contributions to these programs are fully taxable. In addition, Flexible Spending Accounts (FSA) and certain Cafeteria (Section 125) plans provide a mechanism whereby covered workers can directly substitute future Social Security benefi ts with current health and dependent care benefits. Again, the mechanism is the payroll tax exempt status of contributions to FSAs and Section 125 plans. Thereby, current tax law allows workers to reduce their exposure to the Social Security and Medicare systems by choosing to structure part of their compensation in the form of employee benefi ts. This paper analyzes the impacts of this peculiar tax treatment on household retirement income security, focusing on worker retirement security since Social Security and Medicare are primarily old-age anti-poverty programs. 4 Given the complexity of the total structure of the Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) programs and the Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI) program, I analyze only the impacts the current system has on Social Security pension and Medicare components of retiree income security. 5 With respect to the Medicare system, all workers are better off taking compensation in forms not subject to Medicare taxation if system solvency is not an issue. The reason is that households are reducing contributions to a fi xed retirement benefi t that is independent of the level of contributions. Since the household retirement benefi t is fi xed, households could increase consumable income by up to 2.9 percent per year. If we consider long-run system balance, then current law tax treatment is likely contributing to Medicare system insolvency.
With respect to the Social Security system, the welfare effects on households are harder to predict because annual contributions are capped at a maximum taxable wage, with benefi ts a function of each worker's prior contributions wage base. Households suffi ciently above the taxable maximum face incentives to alter the form of compensation due to the Medicare contribution effect but will have no Social Security effect. Households below the taxable maximum also face incen-tives to alter the form of compensation, but must weight the cost of future Social Security benefit reductions. Whether the shift in forms of compensation is welfare improving depends on a variety of factors, including lifetime earnings, contributions and returns to household retirement accounts, mortality, expected length of retirement, average wage growth and the benefi t formula. If workers must place exempted earnings in a retirement account (i.e., an add-on account), then all workers tend to be better off from a retirement resource perspective. If workers can consume the exempted income, then those with lower lifetime earnings tend to have lower retirement resources, whereas higher income workers may be better off partially opting out of the system, depending on the factors listed above.
We can examine macro-economic data for consistency with the hypothesis that some workers are reducing exposure to the Social Security and Medicare systems. 6 Figures 1 and 2 provide time series on the relationships between total compensation, covered Social Security earnings, and taxable Social Security earnings for employed and self-employed workers, respectively, over the 1970 to 2002 period. 7 Figure 1 shows that the ratio of taxable to covered wages rose substantially after indexing began in the mid-1970s, reaching a maximum of about 91 percent in 1983. The ratio fell by close to 6 percentage points of over the 1984 to 2000 period, and has increased slightly thereafter. In addition, the ratio of taxable wages to total compensation has been fairly constant at approximately 66 percent. The problem with these measures 4 We consider this tax treatment peculiar since the tax status of certain components of compensation depends on who "writes the check" for the benefi ts. Ideally, the tax code should be neutral with respect to who writes the check. 5 Incorporating the full effects of current law of the DI and survivors components is a topic of future research. 6 Ideally we would look at aggregated micro data. Unfortunately, this type of detail is not available for total compensation. 7 Covered wages are all cash earnings for workers covered by the Social Security system. Taxable wages are covered wages at or below the maximum taxable wage. Both series come from the Social Security Administration's Annual Statistical Supplement (2004) . Total Compensation data is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA data. is that we cannot discern changes in forms of compensation from changes in the distribution of earnings. A better measure is the ratio of Social Security covered wages to total compensation, which fell from about 78.5 percent to about 74 percent between 1970 and 1993, then rose to about 76 percent in 2002. Interestingly, this ratio fell while overall covered employment in the Social Security system rose, with the inclusion of millions of federal, state, and local government workers. Overall, the employed macro-data is weakly consistent with the hypothesis that employed workers shifted forms of compensation. Figure 2 provides similar time series trends for the self-employed. The evidence of a shift in forms of compensation is stronger, with the ratio of covered earn-ings to total sole-proprietor income falling from a high of 61 percent in 1970 to a low of 42 percent in 2001. Even more dramatic is the decline in the proportion of taxable income to self-employed earnings, falling from a high of 44 percent in 1983 to a low of 28 percent in 2001. Overall, the self-employed time series are strongly consistent with the hypothesis that workers are changing forms of compensation. The relative changes in the employed versus self-employed ratios make sense, given the greater ability of the self-employed to structure their forms of compensation. 8 In addition, these trends have persisted in an environment where, as Figure 3 demonstrates, the overwhelming majority of workers have earnings completely below the maximum taxable wage. As noted in the Social Security Trustee's report (2005) , the reduction in covered and taxable compensation to broad based earnings measures can be attributed to two primary sources. First, the distribution of income has become more skewed, with greater wage growth for workers above the taxable maximum over time. Second, there has been an increasing trend towards taking compensation in forms not subject to payroll taxation. However, the percentage of taxpayers with a covered to taxable ratio equal to one has been relatively stable over the past 25 years. Figure  3 provides time series of the percentage of employed and self-employed workers with all earnings below the taxable maximum. Since the start of indexing in the mid-1970s, over 90 percent of workers have had covered earnings fully subject to payroll taxation.
Overall, the macro-economic data is consistent with the hypothesis that workers are reducing exposure to the Social Security system by changing the form of their compensation. It is particularly notable since the early 1980s, when Congress passed a series of laws that increased payroll taxes and reduced the after-tax present value of benefi ts. The remainder of this paper analyzes the impact of this change on household consumption possibilities and is structured as follows. The second section provides an overview of the current payroll tax treatment of dif-ferent forms of labor compensation. The third section provides an overview of the Social Security benefi t structure and develops a model of compensation and choice for analyzing the effects of opting out of the Social Security system. The fourth section develops a model useful in measuring the lifetime welfare effects of changing forms of compensation. The fi fth section provides estimates for the impact on retirement resources from changing forms of compensation. The sixth section offers fi nal thoughts.
THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE TAXABLE PAYROLL
This section provides an overview of the current payroll tax treatment of different forms of labor compensation. I demonstrate that the contribution rate for a worker varies by who "writes the check" for certain forms of employee compensation. Throughout the discussion I maintain the assumption that all forms of cash and benefi ts comprise employee compensation. That is, employees ultimately pay for their benefi ts, regardless of who writes the check. Table 1 provides an overview of the current payroll tax treatment of various forms of compensation. Cash wages are subject to Social Security and Medicare taxation. Employee contributions to health insurance, life insurance, and retirement savings are also subject to Social Security and Medicare taxation. This tax treatment extends to both the employer's and employees' obligation of 7.65 percent each up to the maximum taxable wage and 1.45 percent each for amounts over the maximum taxable wage. By contrast, employer contributions to health insurance, life insurance and retirement savings are exempt from Social Security and Medicare taxation. In addition, employee contributions to Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs), which may be used to fund current health care and dependent care expenses, are exempt from Social Security and Medicare taxation.
As an example, consider a worker who is covered by a group health insurance plan and a group retirement plan. Assume that annual premiums to health insurance are $2,500 and the employee desires to save an additional $7,500 in the retirement savings plan. I consider two scenarios, one in which the employee pays all benefi t costs out of cash salary, the other in which the employer writes the check for the benefi ts. I assume the employee pays income tax at an average marginal rate of 20 percent and is covered by the Social Security and Medicare systems. 9 Table 2 provides the structure of total compensation for our hypothetical em-ployee. Under scenario one, the worker has $75,000 of gross cash salary. The employee pays $2,500 for health insurance and contributes an additional $7,500 to retirement savings. These contributions are not subject to income tax but are subject to payroll taxation. Total income tax and payroll tax payments are $13,000 and $11,475, respectively. Disposable income after taxes and benefi t contributions is $46,262.50. Total compensation, which includes employer contributions to Social Security and Medicare, is $80,737.50.
In scenario two, I set total compensation equal to $80,737.50, the amount of total compensation in scenario one. I then determine the structure of taxes and disposable income given that the employer "writes the check" for the health insurance premiums and retirement savings contributions. Cash salary is reduced by $10,000 and is now $65,000. This has no impact on income tax liability but reduces payroll tax liability $1,530. In order to hold total compensation fi xed, I assume that the employer paid share of the reduction in Social Security taxes is placed in the retirement account, increasing retirement contributions to $8,265. The employee paid share of the reduced Social Security tax fl ows through and increases disposable income by $765 to $47,027.50. Note that the worker's change in cash salary need not exactly equal $10,000. The agreement between the employer and employee could call for the all foregone tax contributions to go to cash salary. Alternatively, the arrangement could be structured such that tax liability is minimized but disposable income is unaffected. Table 3 presents these two cases. Given our parameters, scenario three changes compensation in order to minimize tax liability and maximize disposable income. Scenario four reduces cash salary and increases retirement contributions in a way that minimizes exposure to both income and payroll tax systems while holding total compensation and disposable income fi xed.
As shown in Table 1 , it is not necessary for the employer and employee to negotiate a change in the composition of compensation in order for the worker to partially opt out of the Social Security system. If workers have the option of contributing to an FSA, then they can directly reduce their contributions to Social Security and Medicare. For 2005, the maximum FSA contribution for dependent care expenses is the minimum of cash salary or $5,000. The regulatory dollar maximum for health care expenses is cash salary. 10 This would seem to sug-gest that workers could completely opt out of their Social Security and Medicare contributions. However, FSA contributions must be used in the year the funds are contributed. Any leftover funds revert to the employer. Clearly, this places a limit on the viability of FSAs as a mechanism for reducing payroll tax liability.
As an example, consider the FSA contribution necessary to reduce Social Security contributions by two percentage points, from 12.4 percent to 10.4 percent of taxable payroll. For individuals at or below the taxable maximum wage, this requires a reduction in payroll taxable wages of approximately 16.13 percent.
For an individual at the 2005 taxable maximum wage of $90,000, this requires an FSA contribution of about $14,516. For a worker with a salary of $50,000, the contribution would be approximately $8,065. However, it should be noted that this method ignores the impact on Medicare contributions, which also decline due to reduction in payroll taxable wages. This means the actual reduction in payroll tax liability is larger, since exposure to the Medicare system is also reduced.
It is important to note that, while the re-characterizing income reduces payroll tax liability, it also reduces future Social Security benefi ts. Whether or not the worker is better off is then a question of the impact on lifetime consumption. I analyze this lifetime consumption effect in the next two sections.
THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
In this section I analyze the impact that the change in form of compensation, outlined in the four scenarios above, has on future Social Security benefi ts. I show that the impact on retirement income security depends on how the change in compensation, and the resulting deduction in tax liability, is allocated between current consumption and retirement saving. If the change is devoted entirely to retirement saving, then the worker is unambiguously better off, from the perspective of retirement income security. I then use the results of this section to develop a more complete model of lifetime welfare in the fourth section.
The Social Security benefi t formula is a function of the average of the high 35 years of covered, payroll taxable earnings. To make past earnings equivalent to current earnings, past earnings are indexed to the Social Security national average wage index series, with the index value set to one at age 60 for each birth cohort. Summing a worker's indexed annual series and dividing by total months of covered employment (up to a maximum of 420 months) provides a measure of lifetime earnings called Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). This amount is then applied to a progressive benefi t formula designed to provide a larger wage replacement ratio for workers with lower average lifetime earnings. 11 Progressivity in the benefi t formula is achieved by providing a smaller marginal benefi t as AIME rises, with marginal benefi t bend points around a 90 percent, a 32 percent, and a 15 percent replacement ratio.
As noted in the previous section, changing the form of compensation to reduce Social Security tax liability will also reduce future Social Security benefi ts. The amount of the reduction will depend on how much the exempt income reduces the AIME of the worker. For workers whose earnings are still in excess of the taxable maximum after the change in compensation, there is no effect on either future Social Security or Medicare benefi ts. The reason is that there is no impact on wages counted for Social Security benefi t purposes, and the Medicare benefi t is independent of the level of contributions or earnings. 12 In this case, the change in form of compensation is strictly welfare improving since current period tax liabilities have been reduced without sacrifi cing any future benefi ts.
However, as shown in Figure 3 , most workers have earnings at or below the taxable maximum. As an example, consider the hypothetical worker in the previous section. To measure the marginal effect of shifting compensation out of the Social Security (and Medicare) tax base, assume the worker turned age 60 in 2000 and that past Social Security covered earnings were $75,000, in wage indexed terms, over the past 40 years. Consider the impact of a recharacterization of compensation in 2002, when the worker is aged 62. Table 4 shows the worker's AIME and Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) at Normal Retirement Age for each of the four scenarios discussed above. The reductions range from a low of $44 per year for the least tax advantaged change to a $52 per year change for the most tax advantaged change.
Considering the value of the extra savings on retirement income, the one-year savings would provide a 20-year annuity 11 The Social Security wage replacement ratio is defi ned as the ratio of the gross-of-tax benefi t to gross-of-tax earnings. 12 The Medicare benefi t will be impacted only if a worker has earnings below the basic coverage requirement for earning credits towards full insurance.
equal to approximately $51 and $127 for scenarios two and four, respectively. 13 So, the re-characterization of compensation could be welfare improving from an expected lifetime consumption perspective. Note however, that only in scenario four does the shift in compensation produce a large welfare improvement. In scenario two, the welfare change is very small and would not be robust to small changes in the underlying assumptions. For example, if a slightly higher discount rate were used or if actual life expectancy is longer than 20 years, then the change in compensation outlined in Scenario two may have a negative impact of lifetime welfare. For Scenario four, the intuition for the size of welfare improvement is two-fold. First, the worker's lifetime wages are at or close to the taxable maximum over a 40 year period. Thereby, the impact of the one-time reduction amounts to less than 0.5 percent of average taxable earnings. Second, the worker receives an additional 15.3 cents in savings for every dollar reduction in taxable wages but looses only 15 cents per dollar in future benefi ts. This implies that a small real rate of return is suffi cient to guarantee a welfare improvement. 14 The example of the previous two sections shows that a relatively high earning worker will likely be better off by shifting forms of compensation in a least one year late in his career. It remains to be seen however, if this holds for large groups of workers with different earnings profi les and at different points in the life cycle. In the next section, I develop a model for analyzing life cycle effects for a heterogeneous population.
LIFE CYCLE CONSUMPTION EFFECTS
In this section, I analyze whether a permanent change in form of compensation is welfare improving for different types of workers across the earnings distribution. To explore this issue, I develop a simple two-period model that captures the impact of changing forms of compensation on lifetime consumption possibilities and welfare. In general, I fi nd that it is possible, but not certain, that a worker will be better off from a change in forms of compensation. The reason is that a reduction in tax liability today is partially paid for in reduced future public pension benefi ts. The more generous the pension benefi t rule, the higher must be the rate of return on alternative investments in order to overcome the reduction in public benefi ts. A notable exception is the case of a household with no private saving. In this case, the change in forms of compensation of fi rst period consumption may be welfare enhancing if the household has a suffi ciently high rate of inter-temporal substitution.
Consider an economy where individuals live for two periods, working in the fi rst and retired in the second. In the fi rst period, workers choose the amount of 13 I assume a real return of 3 percent on the annuity, consistent with the Intermediate range assumptions of the 2004 Social Security Trustees Report (2005) . 14 This amounts to about 2.85 percent for Scenario 2 but 0 percent for Scenario 4. income-tax deferred retirement saving and the level of fi rst period compensation. In addition to any private savings, workers receive a fi xed public pension benefi t (akin to Medicare) and a public pension benefit that is a function of their first period public pension plan tax contributions. I analyze two cases. In the fi rst case, workers split earnings between income tax-exempt benefi ts and saving and other consumption, with all wages subject to the public pension tax. The second case is similar to the fi rst except that workers' saving and benefi ts are also exempt from the public pension tax. In each case, the fixed public benefit is independent of the public pension tax, whereas the variable public pension piece is a function of earnings subject to public pension tax. The consequence of this system is that a change in the form of compensation that reduces public pension taxes also reduces future expected public pension benefi ts. I am interested in determining under what conditions a household will have higher life time consumption possibilities given the change in form of compensation. The household's maximization problem is:
Subject to:
CASE 1: benefi ts and savings included in public pension contribution base.
(
CASE 2: benefi ts and savings exempted from public pension tax base.
Where C 1 is consumption in period i = 1, 2, β is the fraction of non-salary benefi ts (assumed exogenously determined) consumed in period 1, S is retirement saving, W is total compensation, including fringe benefi ts, earned by inelastic labor, and r is the pre-tax return to retirement saving. 15 The government levies a per period income tax, τ I , on wages, savings, and on a proportion θ of the variable part of the public pension. The public pension tax is τ P , with the tax base some function of labor earnings, as outlined in each case above.
The public pension benefi t is comprised of two parts; a minimum threshold benefi t, P -, and a marginal benefi t formula ρ(Ŵ ) that depends on the structure of the taxable wage base Ŵ . I analyze two scenarios. The fi rst scenario assumes β = 0. That is, any fi rst period fringe benefi ts are fully taxable. The second scenario relaxes this assumption. Assuming β = 0 and solving case 1 for the inter-temporal budget constraint yields:
The interpretation of the budget constraint is familiar and straight forward, with R equal to the market discount rate on second period consumption and the public pension and equal to the after-tax rate of return of private saving. Again for β = 0, solving for the intertemporal budget constraint for case 2 yields:
R 15 β is assumed exogenous. It could be a household choice variable.
Where now R = [(1 + r)(1 -τ I ) -ρ(1 -θτ I )]/(1 -τ I -τ P ). The case 2 discount rate accounts for the fact that the net relative return to private saving is offset by a reduction in the public pension benefi t but is increased by the fi rst period exemption from payroll tax.
With respect to inter-temporal consumption, the opportunity set for each of the two lifetime budget constraints is a function of wages, tax rates, the generosity of the benefi t rule, the percent of tax-exempt consumption, and the after-tax rates of return of retirement saving and Social Security benefi ts. Whether an individual is better off under a change in form of compensation is a function of the after-tax rates of return and the generosity of the benefi t rule. Figure 4 provides an example, under the assumption that exempted earnings come only in the form of retirement savings (no fringe benefi ts), where households that are liquidity constrained or with high discount rates (high levels of current consumption) may be worse off under the change in form of compensation. However, households with low discount rates (high levels of future consumption) may be better off since the reduction in the opportunity cost of saving provides greater lifetime utility.
It is also possible to have tax and benefi t parameters where no one is better off changing forms of compensation. Figure  5 provides an example of the scenario. In this case, most of the public pension benefi t is captured in the wage variable portion. The reduction in the opportunity cost of saving is insuffi cient to make up for the decline in the variable part of the benefi t. Also, it is also possible for the marginal decline in public pension to offset the private return to a degree that the net rate of return for case 2 is less than that for case 1, resulting in a scenario where the worker is strictly worse off. Figures 4 and 5 can also be interpreted relative to the generosity of the Social Security marginal benefi t rule. That is, Figure 5 is consistent with a marginal benefi t rule that is relatively more generous than the marginal benefi t rule in Figure 4 . This can be seen by noting that exempting compensation has a much larger impact on the total public pension in Figure 5 than in Figure 4 . The implication is that for households with low lifetime earnings, it might be very diffi cult to provide a rate of return adequate to make up for the generosity of the Social Security benefi t rule. To summarize, when only saving is exempted from the payroll tax base, low lifetime income and low saving households will generally be worse off from the change in forms of compensation, whereas higher lifetime income and high saving households may be better off from changing forms of compensation.
Turning our attention to current tax law treatment, I consider the generalized case where β > 0, with both private savings and a percentage of current compensation excluded from the payroll tax base. Solving for the inter-temporal budget constraint for case 1, in which saving and benefi ts are exempt from fi rst period income tax:
Where R is defi ned as in equation [1] . The difference from equation [1] is that the relative price of fi rst period consumption has fallen, increasing consumption possibilities for liquidity constrained households or those with high discount rates. Note in particular the importance of the public pension benefi t not being reduced due to the favorable tax treatment on fi rst period benefi ts. As shown in Figure 6 , all households will tend to be better off, relative to a regime in which fi rst period consumption is fully taxed, since government claims on income are reduced. 16 The fi nal scenario for analysis is the case where β > 0 and savings and benefi ts are exempt from all fi rst period taxes. Solving for the inter-temporal budget constraint yields:
Where R is defi ned as in equation [2] . The price of fi rst period consumption has been lowered due to the exemption of benefi ts from payroll tax, but has been increased due to the second period reduction to the public pension. Thereby, the overall effect on the price of fi rst period consumption depends on the present value of the net benefit from the change in compensation. If it is positive, then the price falls, otherwise it rises. The basic intuition is similar to the previous scenarios, with potential changes in lifetime consumption possibilities a function of tax parameters and rates of return between private saving and the public pension. Figure 7 provides one possible outcome for the change in consumption possibilities between a tax regime where benefi ts are exempt from income tax and one in which benefi ts are exempted from both income and payroll taxes. In this example, the relevant parameters result in a situation where two types-low discounters (high future consumption) and high discounters (high current consumption)-are each potentially better off with the change in form in compensation. The high discount worker is better off since it is relaxing the fi rst period consumption constraint. Low discounters are better off due to an increase in the net relative return to saving, increasing consumption possibilities in both periods.
Clearly, the interest is in what range of parameter provides the likelihood of welfare enhancing given a change in forms of compensation. In the next section, I construct a Social Security reform proposal that stylizes the previous analysis and provide estimates on the net impact on retirement resources when workers are allowed to exempt part of their compensation from the Social Security tax base.
EXEMPTING COMPENSATION: IMPACT ON RETIREMENT RESOURCES
In this section, I provide estimates of the impact on retirement resources from a policy change that extends current law treatment of employer contributions to retirement plan contributions by workers. That is, the policy allows workers to exempt part of their earnings from the Social Security tax base, with the exempted earnings placed in a defi ned contribution retirement account. The analysis has two primary assumptions. One, the exemption applies only to the OASI wage base, leaving the DI and HI bases unaffected. Two, workers may exempt the maximum of 5 percent of wages or $3,000. This choice of policy is designed to replicate average contribution rates to 401(k)s and prior year maximum contributions to IRAs. I do not analyze a case analogous to the current policy debate (a prototype 2 percent carve-out account) due to the large reduc-tion in taxable wages required. This can be seen in Table 5 , which provides measures for the impact on taxable wages required to achieve tax carve-outs in the range of 1 to 4 percentage points. 17 These proposals require compensation and consumption shifts that are too large, on the magnitude of approximately 9.5 percent to 38 percent respectively, relative to observed average contribution rates to 401(k) and IRA plans. I analyze a hybrid proposal in which workers exempt earnings from the payroll tax base, with the government rebating payroll tax contributions into the accounts after annual tax fi ling. I provide measures on the impact from two potential regimes. To begin, I assume the exempted earnings and foregone payroll taxes must be saved in a tax preferred retirement account. This regime can be considered a hybrid mix of an "add-on" proposal and a "carve-out" proposal. Assuming the exempted wages are new saving, all households experience a net gain in consumable retirement resources, even when assuming conservative rates of return equal to the risk-free return to trust fund assets. I also provide estimates under the assumption that households may either consume or use existing saving as exempted income but must save the foregone taxes in a tax-preferred retirement account. This regime is analogous to basic "carve-out" types of proposals. Under this regime, workers with lower lifetime income experience a net decline in retirement resources but higher lifetime income households have a net increase in retirement resources. 18 In the third section, I provided an example that indicated that a one-year end-of-working career marginal change may provide a small net increase in lifetime retirement resources. I now analyze the impact on two cohorts of workers-workers who are at the mid-point of the working life cycle and workers who are at the beginning of their working life cycle. To facilitate the analysis, I use the Social Security Administration's Any PIA benefi t calculator to measure the change in future Social Security benefi ts from the exemption. 19 Using the intermediate range assumptions from the Social Security Trustee's Report (2005) , I perform the analysis on the four patterns of earnings used by the Social Security Administration-workers with lifetime low income, average income, high income and those with income at or above the maximum taxable wage.
A number of assumptions are necessary since the analysis incorporates a number of variables that will infl uence the benefi t reduction and potential welfare gain, including the number of years between the change in form of compensation and retirement, the rate of return on assets, the growth of real wages, and the infl ation rate. Where possible, I use the intermediate range assumptions of 3.9 percent wage growth, 2.8 percent infl ation, and a moderate 5.8 percent nominal return to assets. The assumption on asset returns is useful in providing insight into likely outcomes if the policy change requires the new accounts to hold only government debt, thereby providing a mechanism for funding the change. I assume the hybrid savings account pays out distributions as a 30-year level annuity. Finally, I solve the benefi t reduction relative to the benefi t each birth cohort receives at Normal Retirement Age (NRA). 20 Finally, I assume a 15 percent marginal income tax rate for the low earners, with 5 percentage point increases for each higher group, respectively. Low and average workers are assumed to have 50 percent of Social Security benefi ts subject to income taxation, and high and maximum earners have 85 percent inclusion rates. Table 6 provides estimates on the impact on retirement resources given a mid-career change. That is, I assume a 45 year work life, with the regime change enacted halfway through the career. The policy change is assumed to occur in 2005, making the calculations relative to the 1963 birth cohort. Assuming the exempted wages are new saving, all households are strictly better off, in terms of after-tax retirement resources, from the compensation change. This is true for both the hybrid regime (total account) and the carve-out regime (tax account). This occurs in part because the reduction in benefi ts is dampened by Social Security career average formula. For example, lifetime low earners and high earners have an additional $2,220 and $4,981 per year in retirement resources, respectively. The hybrid account provides unambiguous gains, especially when measured relative to the carve-out account. If the policy change requires only foregone payroll taxes into the savings account, with the exempted wages consumed or substituted for existing saving, then it is questionable whether lower-income earners will have greater retirement security since lower compound returns could result in a loss of retirement resources. For example, if real returns are zero, then low and average earners would be no better off while high and maximum earners would be marginally better off relative to current law. In addition, estate resources are signifi cantly smaller under the carve-out regime, with a lifetime low earner's estimated lump-sum account of $38,910 for the hybrid account and only $5,130 for the carve-out account. Table 7 provides similar calculations for the cohort of workers born in 1984 and beginning full-time work in 2005. This set of calculations provides insight into how the policy change will fully affects future cohorts of workers. As can be seen, workers fully affected by the policy change may be better or worse off, from a retirement resources perspective, depending on their lifetime earnings profi le and the structure of the policy. Assuming all new saving, all workers are better off from an after-tax perspective. However, the carve-out policy change leaves low and average earners with lower levels of retirement resources than they would receive from Social Security. In addition, high and maximum earners are only marginally better off. In this case, a real return of approximately 1 percent leaves low and average workers worse off and high and maximum earners no better off relative to current law. This analysis points out the importance of structuring reform proposals and retirement policy that encourages new saving. Otherwise it is possible for future generations of workers to have lower levels of retirement resources than received from the current system. A few caveats should be added to the discussion. First, the analysis does not fully incorporate the possibility of shifting savings across instruments. It is possible, and likely, that many higher income households will shift balances from taxable savings accounts into the hybrid account, rather than generate new saving. 21 The analysis above thus provides an upper bound for the impact on retirement resources of allowing workers to exempt some earnings from the payroll tax base by placing the exempted earnings in a tax-preferred account. Second, the analysis does not attempt to measure the impact of the policy change on the solvency of the Social Security Trust fund. As with the Medicare impact, allowing workers to exempt income from the payroll tax base could accelerate the solvency crisis. This could be mitigated, however by devoting future tax revenues attributable to add-on account distributions to the Trust fund. Finally, a hybrid account could have the characteristics of a cash-balance pension plan, with the government allowing voluntary wage credits and providing an interest rate credit equal to that paid to the Social Security trust fund. 22 If structured correctly, such a plan could reduce the government's unfunded liability exposure while maintaining an old-age anti-poverty guarantee.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Current tax law allows workers to opt out, either partially or completely, of the Social Security system. Workers make this choice by taking their compensation in forms not subject to the payroll tax. This decision may increase current disposable income but at the expense of reduced future Social Security benefi ts. This paper analyzes the life cycle consequences, and in particular the impact on retirement resources, of workers' decision to opt out of the Social Security system.
Overall, a change in form of compensation has an ambiguous effect on lifetime consumption. With respect to Social Security, whether a worker will be better off depends on lifetime earnings, the difference in the after-tax rate of return earned on private saving and that earned on social security contributions, income and payroll tax parameters, and inter-temporal rates of time preference. With respect to Medicare, all workers are strictly better off since they reduce contributions to a fixed benefit. However, this welfare enhancement may not persist if account is taken of the increased strain on the solvency of the Medicare system. From the standpoint of retirement resources, I show that hybrid type proposals that direct exempted earnings into personal retirement accounts may increase retirement consumption across the earnings distribution. Carve-out type proposals that direct foregone payroll taxes into personal accounts provide, at best, marginal increases to retirement resources and then only for households with higher lifetime earnings. The results of this paper suggest that policy makers should carefully consider the incentive effects of proposals that reduce the relative generosity of future benefi ts. Tilting the generosity of the system creates incentives for workers to change forms of compensation and partially opt out of the Social Security system and reduce exposure to the Medicare tax system. In addition, otherwise highly compensated workers may appear to be lifetime lower earnings workers due to the ability to partially opt out of the system. The results of the paper also provide insights for policy makers interested in changing the structure of the Social Security system. First, the results suggest it is poor retirement security policy to allow workers to substitute current consumption for future Social Security benefi ts. This suggests that policy makers should reconsider the payroll tax treatment of FSA and Section 125 contributions since the net change in lifetime welfare will tend to be negative for lower income households.
Second, if allowing workers to partially opt out of Social Security is considered socially desirable, then a simple method for building, monitoring, and administering personal accounts is through the wage base (as opposed to through tax contributions.) Expanding the current treatment of CODA and IRA contributions to include exemptions from payroll tax liability will ensure timely deposit of funds, with government refund deposits of payroll taxes administered through annual income tax fi ling. Expanding this treatment will also reduce incentives to reduce Social Security and Medicare tax liability through changing the form of compensation. If current instruments are considered inadequate for insuring proper investment and distribution functions, then the creation of a new instrument (e.g., USA, RSA, LSA, etc.) could easily facilitate the program.
Third, this type of hybrid approach-a mixture of an add-on account and a carveout account-provides a strong mechanism for encouraging private retirement saving while taking pressure off the anti-poverty component of Social Security. This could potentially make future benefi t cuts more palatable as there would be reduced need for old-age anti-poverty insurance.
Fourth, this paper highlights a potential problem with current proposals that reweight the benefi t formula towards those with low lifetime taxable wages. Namely, current law already allows workers with high lifetime income to change forms of compensation in order to reduce exposure to the Social Security system. These re-weighting proposals would increase horizontal inequality by increasing the replacement ratio for workers exempting compensation, while providing a comparatively smaller replacement ratio for workers not exempting income but with similar lifetime compensation profi les. In addition, these proposals would provide added incentives for all workers to change forms of compensation to reduce exposure to the Social Security system since the implicit return to payroll tax contributions will fall.
